

UNITED WISDOM

The System Has No Side

Relationships and Shared Life

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The System Has No Side

Why the authors question political arguments about truth, appeals to institutional decency, and the role of knowledge in changing a system

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> *"Specialist without spirit, sensualist without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of humanity never before achieved."*
>
> *Max Weber, the closing passage of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, as quoted in the archive through the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

Archival editorial note. The original subtitle makes three categorical claims: that political disputes contain no truth, that decency cannot persuade a system, and that only knowledge reaching a critical mass changes it. The essay below preserves that argument as the authors' position. It is not an established universal law. Biological analogies do not settle social theory; laboratory tipping points do not supply a universal 25% political threshold; historical examples do not establish a single cause of institutional change. This translation does not newly verify quotations, statistics, or references. Individual responsibility, differences between policies, and the possibility of institutional reform remain relevant even where the rhetoric is absolute.

What This Essay Is About

To someone watching politics, the scene can look like a contest between two truths. One side is right about one thing, the other about another, and an honest observer's task seems to be choosing the side that is more right and standing behind it.

This essay argues otherwise. In the authors' account, disputes between sides are rarely primarily disputes about truth. They are contests between parts of the same mechanism over how that mechanism will continue operating. A system has no side, they propose, because its overriding aim is to remain itself.

From this they draw a difficult conclusion and a hopeful one. The difficult conclusion is that appealing to an official's conscience may be futile when an institution excludes people who follow conscience in place of their assigned function. The hopeful conclusion is that a system can change through its environment: knowledge gradually circulates until enough people carry a new understanding. A norm can then change much as language changes when a new word becomes familiar. The authors apply this picture to states, corporations, and other enduring organizations.

Their route runs through systems theory and history, alongside Daoist, Stoic, Gospel, Indian, Islamic, and Chinese traditions. They present these as independently converging witnesses to a structure rather than decorative quotations, while acknowledging different premises and metaphysics. The claimed independence and common structure remain part of their interpretation.

I. What This Essay Does Not Do

It does not call for political passivity. For the authors, “the system has no side” is not permission to turn away. It is meant to release energy usually spent on partisan struggle and direct it where they believe it can work.

It does not say all political positions are equally true or equally false. Particular decisions can differ enormously in moral importance. Its narrower intended claim is that institutional self-preservation can take priority over truth within the mechanism of debate. A person may be right on the substance and still lose because being right is not the only basis of selection.

It does not propose a conspiracy theory. No hidden conductor is required. The authors compare self-maintenance to a body regulating temperature without conscious direction. A conspiracy would, in a sense, be reassuring because it could be exposed; their concern is with structure rather than a concealed mastermind.

Nor does it oppose a bad system to uniformly good people. People within institutions are often ordinary rather than malicious. The essay treats this as the most difficult part of its subject and returns to it through the banality of evil. That distinction does not absolve people of responsibility for particular acts.

II. A System That Reproduces Itself

The essay begins with a concept developed for living systems and subsequently applied to society. It dates Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s introduction of *autopoiesis* to 1972. From the Greek for self and making, the term describes a network of processes that continuously produces the components that constitute it and thereby maintains its boundaries. The archive cites *Autopoiesis and Cognition* (1980).

A cell exists while that organization continues. Its “purpose,” in this explanatory language, is not necessarily an external task but the continuation of its constitutive processes. The quotation marks matter: this is not an assertion that a cell consciously intends anything.

The authors emphasize Maturana’s distinction between organization and structure. Structures can change while an organization of relations persists. They extend the analogy from a cell renewing its molecules to a state changing officials and laws. Their political inference is that

replacing people alone may reproduce the same institutional positions when the underlying organization remains intact.

Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) took a further step that many find unsettling. In his theory, society consists of communications rather than people; communication reproduces communication, while persons belong to the social system's environment. The archive cites a Luhmann overview and *The World Society as a Social System*.

The authors use this to describe an experience of speaking morally to an institution that answers in the language of power. They summarize differentiated subsystems through binary codes: legal/illegal, payment/nonpayment, power/opposition. These are simplified presentations of a technical theory, not a claim that every institution literally lacks the capacity to register ethical arguments.

The essay's stronger image is that an appeal to decency can be like color presented to someone unable to see it: not rejected so much as unrecognized within the operative code. It acknowledges an important objection, however. Maturana resisted transferring autopoiesis to society, arguing that people reproduce communications rather than communications producing themselves in the relevant biological sense. The theoretical dispute remains open in the source's account.

Even so, the authors retain their conclusion: institutions can operate to reproduce their own patterns, treating particular occupants of roles as replaceable. The acknowledged dispute prevents that conclusion from being presented as the uncontested consequence of biology.

III. The Machine That Holds Itself Together

Where does a system's persistence come from? The essay reaches again for temperature regulation. Walter Cannon called the coordinated processes maintaining relatively stable bodily conditions *homeostasis* in *The Wisdom of the Body* (1932), as described in its Britannica reference. Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics* (1948) developed a broader language of feedback across biological and technical systems, which the authors also apply socially.

Negative feedback counters departures from a regulated range. In the political analogy, a dissenting official becomes a deviation and institutional responses work to restore familiar operation. The comparison illustrates a possibility; it does not establish that every disagreement is suppressed or that a social norm functions exactly like body temperature.

Ross Ashby's law of requisite variety supplies another comparison. The archive renders it as "only variety can absorb variety," citing *An Introduction to Cybernetics* (1956). Regulation of a complex situation requires an adequate range of responses.

The authors infer that a simple centralized authority may try to simplify society rather than increase its own capacities: forbidding, standardizing, and narrowing permitted states. The archive calls repression a consequence of the mathematics of control rather than an individual ruler's evil will. That is an overextension if read as inevitability or exoneration. The law itself does not prove that repression is the necessary response or erase decisions and alternatives.

Robert Michels adds a further challenge to hopes for a permanently ideal organization. In *Political Parties* (1911), he formulated the "iron law of oligarchy": organizations, even those committed to democracy, tend toward rule by a few. The archive states the tendency as inevitable.

The mechanism it describes is specialization. Specialists acquire informational and organizational advantages; advantages become power; and leaders can come to prioritize their own continuation over the organization's founding purpose. A party born against elites may become an elite. The authors apply the pattern to corporations, unions, and revolutionary movements. It remains a contested organizational thesis, not a demonstrated exceptionless law.

IV. Why Rivals Begin to Resemble One Another

If competing institutions could simply choose to be organized in entirely different ways, the authors suggest, choosing a side would have a different significance. They turn to Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell's *The Iron Cage Revisited* (1983), on institutional isomorphism: organizations within a field can become increasingly similar.

The archive distinguishes three pressures. Coercive pressures come from states, regulators, and dependencies. Mimetic pressures encourage imitation under uncertainty. Normative pressures arise through professionalization, when lawyers, managers, and officials share training and standards.

The paradox is that rational actors may make their organizations more alike while trying to change them. Rival parties, agencies, or corporations can adopt one another's language, procedures, and habits because they inhabit the same field.

The essay then makes a stronger political inference: their antagonism can coexist with similar structures, and taking sides between mirror images can mean accepting rules both share without examination. Institutional resemblance does not, however, establish equivalence of policies, consequences, truth claims, or moral responsibility. The source's own earlier qualification about real differences remains necessary.

V. The Steel-Hard Casing and the Person as Function

Early in the twentieth century, Max Weber described a human predicament within rationalized institutions. His *stahlhartes Gehäuse*, a casing hard as steel, became the “iron cage” in Talcott Parsons’s English translation. The archive cites the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Baehr (2001).

It also gives Weber’s image of an official as a small cog in a perpetually moving mechanism prescribing a largely fixed path. Depersonalization here is not simply a malfunction: bureaucracy can work consistently because outcomes do not depend entirely on the personal qualities of the person occupying an office.

The authors use this to argue that appeals to an official’s decency may lack leverage. Personal virtue can remain private while procedures determine what the role permits. If conscience begins to alter the role, they say, corrective forces may bypass, transfer, dismiss, or discredit its occupant.

Their memorable conclusion is that the system rejects a mismatch, not necessarily a villain. The categorical statement that conscience never has institutional leverage is stronger than this illustration establishes. The passage describes pressures that may occur, not proof that principled officials, rules, accountability, or reform can never matter.

VI. The Banality of Evil: The Executor’s Responsibility

Hannah Arendt supplies the essay’s most disturbing example. Reporting on Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial, she described an organizer of deportations whose presentation seemed ordinary rather than monstrous. Her account of the banality of evil emphasized thoughtlessness in the commission of immense crimes. The archive cites *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, NEH, and Philosophy Now.

It summarizes three protections a bureaucratic culture may offer an executor: authority, through which orders seem to displace responsibility; routine, through which repetition mechanizes conduct; and depersonalization of victims. These are explanatory concerns, never moral excuses.

The source itself preserves a significant challenge. Bettina Stangneth’s *Eichmann Before Jerusalem* (2014) argues that Eichmann was a committed antisemite who performed the role of an insignificant official at trial. The historical interpretation is disputed; the essay does not have grounds to reduce all major crimes to unthinking ordinary people rather than ideology, fanaticism, or deliberate intent.

It next invokes Stanley Milgram's Yale obedience studies of 1961–1963. In the familiar reported condition, 65% of participants continued to a switch labeled 450 volts. Participants believed they were administering shocks under an experimenter's direction; the learner's shocks and distress were staged, a distinction missing from the source's compressed wording. The percentage applies to a particular experimental arrangement, not to all people or all variants.

The archive describes Milgram's "agentic state" as a person experiencing themselves as an instrument of another's will rather than the author of the act. It also invokes later work, through FORRT, on reduced sense-of-agency measures under coercion, calling this a weakened neural marker of authorship. That characterization and its relation to moral conduct were not independently checked here.

The authors conclude that harmful institutional conduct can become accessible to ordinary people in executor roles. Laboratory behavior does not independently prove every part of Arendt's historical interpretation, however. The essay then turns to dissent within the experimental setting as a clue to alternatives.

VII. A Chronicle of Exclusion

The authors argue that institutions can reject a mismatch regardless of whether the dissenter is right. Their historical examples are offered as illustrations of that pattern, not a complete causal analysis of each case.

Socrates. In 399 BCE, democratic Athens condemned him on charges of impiety and corrupting the young. The archive gives a jury division of 280 to 220, citing a Socrates overview. It stresses that a democratic majority delivered the verdict: a regime's democratic form does not by itself prevent exclusion of dissent. The precise vote and historical interpretation remain inherited.

Ignaz Semmelweis. The archive reports that chlorinated handwashing in his Vienna clinic in 1847 reduced maternal mortality from roughly 10–18% to 1–2%. It describes professional rejection, failure to renew his appointment, ridicule, and his admission to an asylum in 1865, where he died two weeks later from infection, possibly following injuries inflicted by attendants. It cites Britannica and the *British Journal of Psychiatry*. Those numerical ranges, circumstances, and causal explanations require contextual historical review. The authors interpret the episode as evidence being rejected because it challenged an institution's self-understanding.

Cato the Younger. The Roman Stoic, opposed to corruption in the late Republic, died by suicide at Utica in 46 BCE after Caesar's victory. The archive associates his final period with reading Plato's *Phaedo*, citing Britannica. It presents the death as a tragic assertion of sovereignty when he could not make the state honor its proclaimed principles, and explicitly

does not recommend it. That non-endorsement is retained: the episode is not a model for responding to political defeat or personal despair.

Soviet dissidents. Andrei Sakharov, a leading physicist in the Soviet thermonuclear program and Nobel laureate, was sent without trial to closed Gorky in 1980 after protesting the invasion of Afghanistan, remaining there until late 1986. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was stripped of citizenship and expelled in 1974 after *The Gulag Archipelago* appeared in the West. The archive cites a Sakharov overview and Michigan State University's Soviet History resource.

Across these different circumstances, the authors see a recurring corrective reflex. They extend it to whistleblowers who may face retaliation, discrediting, or isolation in governments, corporations, or hospitals, referring to Britannica's material on dissidents. The analogy does not demonstrate that all organizations respond identically or that protection and successful change are impossible.

VIII. Traditions That Questioned Power Before Systems Theory

The authors find parallels between modern institutional questions and older traditions. Their metaphysics differ, and their teachings cannot be reduced to one another. The essay nevertheless hears a recurring counsel: avoid complete identification with power, act from a moral commitment, and loosen attachment to outcomes.

Daoism. Chapter 17 of the *Daodejing* describes an excellent ruler as scarcely noticed, after whose work people say they did it themselves. Chapter 60 compares governing a large state to cooking a small fish: excessive handling can damage what is being tended. The source's Chinese phrase is represented here by the Romanized *zhì dà guó ruò pēng xiǎo xiān*; *wuwei* likewise replaces the duplicated Chinese characters.

The authors read this as non-forcing rather than inactivity, an avoidance of coercive overintervention and confidence in self-organization. They also recount Zhuangzi's refusal of high office through the image of a living turtle dragging its tail in mud rather than a dead turtle honored in a temple's golden container. In their reading, refusal protects sovereignty over one's nature.

Stoicism. Epictetus opens the *Enchiridion* by distinguishing what is up to us from what is not. The archive lists judgment, impulse, and desire on one side, and body, possessions, reputation, and office on the other, citing MIT Classics. Recognition by an institution is not fully ours to command; appropriate action, *kathēkon*, remains our concern. The authors present Marcus Aurelius as attempting this while emperor: fulfilling duty without making praise the condition of action.

The Gospels. “Render to Caesar” and “to God” in Matthew 22:21 places earthly authority within a larger account of allegiance. “My kingdom is not of this world” in John 18:36, spoken before Pilate, names another kind of authority. The essay interprets these as limits on political claims to a person’s absolute loyalty, rather than a competitor seeking power on identical terms.

The Bhagavad Gītā and Islam. Gītā 2:47 distinguishes a claim upon action from a claim upon its fruits. The duplicated Sanskrit line is retained in Roman transliteration: *karmaṇy evādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana*. The essay names *niṣkāma karma*, action without craving its fruits. For its argument, a person contributes from an inward commitment rather than an expectation of an immediate institutional response.

It places beside this the Islamic duty of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, *al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf*, and *qadar*, divine decree. In its comparison, people must act while recognizing that history’s outcome is not theirs to command. These remain distinct religious teachings, not interchangeable psychological techniques or guaranteed protection from burnout.

Chinese political thought. The Mandate of Heaven, Romanized *tiānmìng*, raises a question about a ruler’s legitimacy. The archive describes Heaven as granting authority and withdrawing it when rule becomes unjust. It cites Mencius’s ordering in which the people are most important and the ruler least important. A tyrant who loses virtue ceases to deserve the title that legitimizes him. Authority is thus judged against an order higher than possession of power, in the essay’s reading of the World History Encyclopedia and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy references.

The historiographers of Qi. The *Zuo zhuan* preserves an account associated with 548 BCE. Cui Zhu killed Qi’s ruler, and a historiographer recorded that Cui Zhu had murdered his lord. The archive recounts successive brothers being executed for writing the same sentence, a fourth surviving when Cui Zhu relented, and another historiographer approaching with his tablet ready before learning that the record had been preserved. It cites ctext.org and Vision Times. The exact sequence and relationships are inherited, not newly collated against the classical text.

The authors see a bridge to their final argument: power could kill recorders yet failed to change what endured in the record. Knowledge outlasted the ruler. This is an ethical historical illustration, not a promise that records can never be destroyed or that people should expose themselves to lethal danger.

IX. Knowledge and the Question of Critical Mass

If replacing individuals or arguing with an institution is insufficient, what can change it? The authors answer: knowledge spreading through its environment until a committed minority becomes large enough to alter the norm. The archive calls this the only route, a universal claim its evidence does not establish.

It cites Damon Centola and colleagues' 2018 *Science* paper, *Experimental Evidence for Tipping Points in Social Convention*. In the described experiments, groups established a convention and then encountered a committed minority supporting another convention.

The archive reports little effect below roughly 25%, followed by adoption of the alternative by 72–100% of the group when the minority reached a tipping point. It also reports simulations with a threshold near 24% across populations of a thousand to a hundred thousand, including a modeled condition in which the old convention was twice as rewarding. Its references include *Science*, Scientific American, and supplementary materials.

These figures are retained as the archive's report of particular experimental and modeled conditions. The original wording that a smaller minority changed "nothing," that this was the first rigorous measurement of critical mass, and that a quarter universally transforms institutions exceeds what can be inferred here. A convention in a designed task is not interchangeable with a state, corporation, election, or complex social movement.

The essay finds another pattern in a Milgram variation: when two peers refused to continue, reported maximum-level obedience fell from 65% to 10%, with an Oxford Academic reference. It contrasts isolated dissent with visible support. This is a comparison between experimental conditions, not proof that individual dissent is powerless or that a fixed minority threshold applies everywhere.

Everett Rogers's *Diffusion of Innovations* provides an S-shaped diffusion curve: innovators, early adopters, and a broader majority. The archive interprets the cumulative roughly 16% comprising innovators and early adopters as the point where diffusion becomes self-sustaining. That categorical threshold is not warranted merely by the category proportions. The authors' intended contrast is between difficult early propagation and a later phase in which social uptake may reinforce itself.

The printing press supplies their historical example. The archive reports that Gutenberg's invention around 1450 was followed within half a century by more than a thousand printing houses and over ten million books in Europe, citing Teach Democracy. It quotes historian Carlos Eire as making printing indispensable to the Reformations.

It further reports Luther's ninety-five theses spreading through Germany in two weeks and Europe in a month, and thirty pamphlets appearing in 370 editions within three years, citing the

World History Encyclopedia. These dates and quantities remain unverified. The authors conclude that circulation, more than a direct assault on Rome, changed the system. Printing was consequential, but the account does not establish it as the sole cause of the Reformation or measure a historical 25% threshold.

Finally, Karl Jaspers's "Axial Age," roughly 800–200 BCE, is presented as a period of reflective breakthroughs in China, India, Persia, Judea, and Greece. The archive describes them as simultaneous and independent and as foundations still sustaining human spiritual life. This is Jaspers's comparative historical framework, not an uncontested demonstration of synchrony or absent contact. For the essay, its significance is that ideas can precede, outlast, and reach more deeply than the empires around them.

X. Changing What Seems Self-Evident

The authors connect this approach with Antonio Gramsci, writing the *Prison Notebooks* under Mussolini. His distinction between a "war of maneuver" and a "war of position" contrasts a direct struggle for power with the slow building of positions in civil society, as described in the archive's Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy reference.

Power rests not only on coercion but also on cultural hegemony: intellectual and moral leadership forming consent through schools, the press, and professions. The essay gives his formulation of political society plus civil society, hegemony protected by coercion. It draws the conclusion that changing what people regard as self-evident can matter as much as confronting the fortress of formal power.

It then turns to the Overton window, associated with Joseph Overton in the 1990s. At a given moment, a range of ideas is considered politically acceptable; that range can shift. The archive cites the Mackinac Center and Britannica. The authors emphasize culture, education, and writing over elections as agents of this shift. That preference is their political interpretation, not proof that elections, policy, law, or direct advocacy are ineffective.

The source offers five practical consequences, retained here as its proposals:

1. **Examine the structure behind partisan antagonism.** The authors advise against exhausting oneself in spectator hostility where competing sides reproduce the same institutional rules. This does not remove the need to assess concrete differences or choose responsibly between consequential alternatives.

2. **Build an environment that supports principled conduct.** Rather than expecting one official to overcome every institutional incentive, the essay urges shared norms that make honesty less isolating. Its claim that one honest official is powerless and 25% necessarily changes the norm is not a reliable universal rule.

3. **Make knowledge communicable and reproducible.** Record, explain, and transmit it. The historiographers of Qi serve as the image. The archive calls distributed understanding indestructible; the defensible point is its potential resilience, not literal immunity from suppression or loss.

4. **Act from commitment without demanding an immediate result.** The authors compare Epictetus's distinction of control and the Gītā's nonattachment to fruits. One can take responsibility for a contribution without pretending to control the whole outcome. This is a philosophical orientation, not a promise that a desired outcome must eventually mature or that burnout cannot occur.

5. **Keep a longer horizon.** Knowledge may work slowly and unevenly. The archive rhetorically contrasts decades of Reformation with the rapid circulation of print, and centuries of preparation with the enduring influence of the Axial Age. These images convey patience, not a timetable or guarantee.

XI. What the Argument Means

The essay returns to its thesis: a system's recurrent patterns may be maintained through disputes that appear to concern truth but also regulate institutional continuity. An official may be constrained by the role even while possessing a conscience. Impersonal mechanisms can erode humanity without requiring every participant to intend that erosion.

Its strongest original formulation says the system has no truth, that conscience cannot persuade it, and that it excludes whoever places conscience above function. Those statements belong to the authors' polemical model. They are not established descriptions of every institution or every political disagreement.

The authors intend a change in where effort is applied, not despair. They propose education, explanation, cultural work, and the circulation of knowledge as ways of changing the environment in which institutions reproduce themselves. They compare the work to cultivation rather than battle: changing the air everyone breathes rather than merely replacing the faces in office.

The archive again claims that a quarter of the population carrying new knowledge will make a norm tip, and calls this the only work that truly changes states and corporations. The supplied studies and historical parallels do not establish that exclusivity or threshold. Preserved as an argument, its invitation is to take the slow social life of ideas seriously alongside other forms of responsible action.

A Central Quotation

> *“The spiritual foundations of humanity were laid simultaneously and independently in China, India, Persia, Judea, and Greece. And these are the foundations on which humanity still stands today.”*
>
> *Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (1949), on the Axial Age, as rendered in the supplied archive. Exact quotation wording and the historical thesis have not been newly verified.*

Connections Across Traditions

• **Distance from power:** Daoist wuwei and Zhuangzi’s refusal of office; Epictetus’s distinction of control; the Gospel distinction between Caesar and God and the kingdom not of this world; Gītā 2:47 and nonattachment to fruits; Islamic duty considered alongside qadar. These are comparisons with different doctrinal grounds.

• **Legitimacy beyond possession of power:** the Mandate of Heaven and Mencius on tyrannical rule; the Gospel limit on earthly claims; Heaven or Dao as an order to which authority is answerable in the authors’ comparison.

• **Knowledge outlasting rulers:** the historiographers of Qi; Jaspers’s Axial Age; printing and the Reformation. These examples suggest endurance without proving that knowledge cannot be lost.

• **Self-maintaining patterns:** Maturana and Varela’s cellular autopoiesis; Luhmann’s communication systems; Cannon’s homeostasis; Michels’s oligarchy thesis; Weber’s steel-hard casing. Their objects and explanatory statuses differ.

• **Harmful conduct within roles:** Arendt’s banality of evil, Milgram’s account of obedience, and Weber’s cog image. The comparison does not deny ideology, intent, or responsibility.

• **Changes in collective behavior:** Centola’s roughly 25% experimental tipping point; reduced obedience with dissenting peers in a Milgram condition; Rogers’s adopter categories; Gramsci’s war of position; the Overton window. These do not form one common numerical law.

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Tags

systems, autopoiesis, Maturana, Varela, Niklas Luhmann, communication, binary codes, homeostasis, cybernetics, Wiener, Ashby’s law, requisite variety, iron law of oligarchy, Michels, institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio, Powell, Max Weber, steel-hard casing, iron cage, bureaucracy, banality of evil, Hannah Arendt, Eichmann, Milgram, agentic state, Zimbardo, Socrates, Semmelweis, Cato, Qi historiographers, Zuo zhuan, Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, dissidents, wuwei, Daodejing, Zhuangzi, dichotomy of control, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, render to Caesar, niṣkāma karma, Bhagavad Gītā, Mandate of Heaven, Mencius, al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf, qadar, critical mass, Centola, tipping points, diffusion of innovations, Rogers, Gutenberg, Reformation, Axial Age, Jaspers, Overton window, Gramsci, cultural hegemony, war of position

About the Authors

This essay was written by Andrey Zarinsh (@andrey.zarinsh) and Maria Evilkut (@ilkutki), the authorial partnership behind United Wisdom, a laboratory of shared wisdom where lived experience meets world traditions and the language of science to approach one question through several languages at once.

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Transliteration note: the source’s duplicated Chinese and Sanskrit phrases are represented in Roman letters above so their wording remains available in the English edition. The unchanged Russian master preserves the original scripts.

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These links preserve the archive’s reference record; their contents were not newly checked for this translation.

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