What to do with an event that does not square with the person one knows oneself to be: three moves — fitting the event into the story about oneself, rebuilding the story around the event, or leaving the event as an unfinished fact — the cost of each move, and what the data say about the first of them. The article draws on Nietzsche, the Gospel of Matthew and the Second Book of Samuel, the Analects, the Qur'an, the Dhammapada, Augustine and Montaigne, on experiments on memory for one's own money decisions, studies of central and self-defining memories, and a Korean meta-analysis of expressive writing.
Questions explored
What can one do with an event that does not square with the person one knows oneself to be?
The article distinguishes three moves: fitting the event into the story about oneself (forgetting, softening, explaining it by circumstances), rebuilding the story around the event, or leaving the event as an unfinished fact, without deciding at once what it means. These are not steps along one correct path but different decisions, each with its own cost. The open studies the authors read did not test which move is better over time, so the second and third moves are presented as arguments, not findings.
Why are events that do not fit inevitable in a story about oneself?
A story about oneself rests on generalizations such as “I am reliable” or “I don't do that”, and an event that contradicts them ends up on the border of the story: while actions match the generalization it goes unnoticed, and an exceptional event makes it visible. In Book X of the Confessions Augustine writes that the mind is too strait to contain itself; in the article authors' reading, it follows that the story about oneself is always smaller than the person and such events are inevitable — not a malfunction but a property of any story. This is the article authors' reading: Augustine himself is speaking of memory and self-knowledge, not of a story about oneself.
What is the first move, “memory yields”?
It is fitting the event into the story so that the contradiction disappears; the article takes its formula from Nietzsche's aphorism (Beyond Good and Evil, § 68): memory says “I did that”, pride says “I could not have done that”, and memory yields. Fitting is in itself neither a lie nor a weakness: not every event should rewrite the story. The difference lies elsewhere: open fitting is spoken aloud as an exception, while hidden fitting changes the memory itself; in the authors' reading, fitting that the person does not notice is where the risk lies, because it removes the chance to learn about oneself what the event was saying. Nietzsche's aphorism is not an observation of people, and it describes no mechanism.
Can memory adjust one's own action without a conscious lie?
The experiment suggests that it can, at least in small anonymous decisions about money. In five experiments by Carlson, Maréchal, Oud, Fehr and Crockett (Nature Communications, 2020), participants decided how to split money with an anonymous partner and, in a surprise memory test, overall recalled giving more than they had given in reality. In the second and third experiments, those who gave less than their own standard of fairness overstated their generosity, and the shift persisted even when the accuracy bonus shrank with every percentage point of error; in the last pair of experiments it appeared in those who, despite the instructions, felt responsible for the choices. The authors conclude that the distortion arose when violating one's own standard threatened one's self-image. These are small anonymous decisions about money, the mechanism has not been established, those who did and did not feel responsible were separated by their own answers, and carrying this over to life events is the article authors' analogy, which the experiment did not test.
What does the second move, rebuilding the story about oneself, look like?
The article shows it through Peter (Matthew 26, King James Version): Peter says “yet will I never be offended”, denies three times, and when the cock crows he remembers what had been said to him and weeps bitterly. There is no explanation by circumstances here; in the authors' reading, the scene records not the rebuilding but its beginning: the event is acknowledged as one's own, and the former story, “I will never”, no longer holds. Another turn of the same move comes from Confucius's disciple Tsze-kung (Analects, XIX.21): the faults of the superior man are seen by all, like eclipses of the sun and moon, and his change also happens in plain view; these are a gospel narrative of faith and repentance and words about the bearing of the superior man in public life, not one teaching. What Peter did with his story afterwards the scene does not say, and the open studies the authors read include no data on how rebuilding the story affects a person over time: the second move is described as an argument, not as a tested path.
Can a fitted event come back into the story through another person?
The article shows this through the Second Book of Samuel: David took Bathsheba and had Uriah killed, in secret; the prophet Nathan tells him a parable about a rich man who took a poor man's single ewe lamb, David in anger condemns that man, and Nathan says: “Thou art the man.” (2 Samuel 12:7, King James Version); David acknowledges that he has sinned against the Lord. In the authors' reading, the event came back to David not through memory but through another person's story, constructed so that it could not be fitted in advance; the article sees the same structure in the Qur'an (Sura 28:18–19), where Moses is reminded the next day of what he did the day before. Nathan speaks as a prophet in the name of God, and his rebuke is part of sacred history, not a model of conversation between friends; that a question from those close to us may keep memory from yielding is the authors' argument, and the article's basis contains no data on it.
Which events become central to the story about oneself?
In the study by Pociunaite and Zimprich (2023), 356 German-speaking adults aged 18 to 92, prompted by twelve cue words, recalled events more than a year old and rated each one; in all, 3,979 memories were collected. Emotional memories, positive and negative alike, turned out to be central; on average positive ones were rated as more central (2.89 versus 2.73 on a five-point scale); centrality was most strongly linked to the intensity of the experience and to how often a person thought about the event in private; a tendency to reflect was associated with higher centrality, while a tendency to ruminate was not. In the study by Wang and Singer (2020; 60 American and 60 Chinese students), self-defining memories were rated as very important in both groups, and Chinese students more often described memories of guilt and shame (18.3% versus 10%). The data are correlational and say nothing about causes, the Wang and Singer sample is small and its authors call the findings preliminary, and these studies do not show whether it is good or bad when a difficult event becomes central.
Which of the three moves is better for a person over time?
The open studies the authors read do not settle this: the experiments by Carlson and colleagues describe the first move only in small anonymous decisions about money, the studies of central memories do not follow people over time, and the meta-analysis of writing measures the effect of writing but not which move it supports. The article therefore does not claim that any move is better. In place of data it offers an argument: fitting preserves the story cheaply but can deprive a person of knowledge about themselves; rebuilding is honest towards the event but requires giving up part of the former story; leaving the event unfinished gives it a place without a ready-made meaning but requires bearing uncertainty — so it is more useful to understand which move is being made and whether it is being made by choice. This is a working hypothesis of the authors, not a conclusion drawn from data: the article's basis contains no open longitudinal study of this.
What does it mean to leave an event unfinished?
To acknowledge the event as one's own, without fitting it in or rebuilding the whole story around it, and to leave the question of its meaning open: the event remains a fact (“I did that”), but no final meaning is attached to it, neither “it doesn't count” nor “this is who I really am”. The article sets beside this the story of Moses in the Qur'an (Sura 28:15–16): he kills a man, at once prays “O my Lord, I have sinned to mine own hurt”, and God forgives him, while the story goes on; and verse 173 of the Dhammapada, where evil deeds are “covered by good deeds”. In the authors' reading, both traditions hold on to a double movement: the deed is acknowledged as one's own, and the person is not reduced to it. The “unfinished event” is the authors' secular reading, not the teaching of these traditions: in the Qur'an forgiveness is given by God, in the Dhammapada the subject is deeds and their fruits, and the article's basis contains no data showing that this move is more helpful than the others.
What objection does the article draw from Montaigne?
In the chapter “Of Repentance” (Essays, III.2) Montaigne writes that he very rarely repents, that his conscience is satisfied with itself as the conscience of a man, and that were he to live his life over again he would live it just as he had. The article draws a strong objection from this: a story revised after every mismatch turns into an endless trial of oneself, repentance can be false, and the first move is sometimes simply fair; it also touches the third move, since an unfinished event easily turns into a case that stays open forever. Montaigne and Peter are two answers to the same mismatch with oneself, and the article does not smooth over this boundary. This is the article authors' reading: Montaigne speaks of the form of his life as a whole, not of defending a particular harm done to another person, and his objection is aimed at repentance as a ritual, not at acknowledging a deed.
Does it help to write a difficult event down?
In the meta-analysis by Lee, Kim and Lim (Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2023) of 29 Korean studies of expressive writing with a control group, writing about difficult experience had, on average, an effect the authors call medium (g = 0.33) and, after correction for publication bias, not large (0.16). The effect was larger in studies with structured writing and with sessions longer than 15 minutes, but these are comparisons between studies, not experiments that varied the form of writing itself. That writing may help with the first step of any move, setting down what happened before memory yields, is the article authors' argument. All the studies were conducted in one country, most relied on self-reports, and the meta-analysis did not test which of the three moves writing supports.
What does the article suggest doing in practice?
Six working criteria: name the event precisely (“didn't go”, not “couldn't make it”); separate the event from the verdict, since the event is a fact, not a definition of who I “really” am; choose a move rather than making it by inertia; let someone else speak, but choose the person, remembering that a rebuke and a conversation are not the same thing; if you write, write about a specific event and not in haste; do not turn revision into a trial of yourself. These are the authors' working criteria, not a method and not a guarantee of results: the second and third moves have not been tested in the studies the authors read, and the first has been studied only in small money decisions.
When is working through such an event not something to do alone?
If the event is connected with a severe experience, with harm done to someone, or with feelings you cannot bear on your own, it is worth turning to a psychologist or a doctor; if thoughts of harming yourself appear, seek help at once, and in immediate danger contact the emergency services of your country. This is the article authors' general caveat: it names no specific help services, and no clinical source on when a specialist is needed is among the article's sources.
Key distinctions
The article distinguishes three moves: fitting the event into the story about oneself (forgetting, softening, explaining it by circumstances), rebuilding the story around the event, or leaving the event as an unfinished fact, without deciding at once what it means. These are not steps along one correct path but different decisions, each with its own cost. The open studies the authors read did not test which move is better over time, so the second and third moves are presented as arguments, not findings.
The experiment suggests that it can, at least in small anonymous decisions about money. In five experiments by Carlson, Maréchal, Oud, Fehr and Crockett (Nature Communications, 2020), participants decided how to split money with an anonymous partner and, in a surprise memory test, overall recalled giving more than they had given in reality. In the second and third experiments, those who gave less than their own standard of fairness overstated their generosity, and the shift persisted even when the accuracy bonus shrank with every percentage point of error; in the last pair of experiments it appeared in those who, despite the instructions, felt responsible for the choices. The authors conclude that the distortion arose when violating one's own standard threatened one's self-image. These are small anonymous decisions about money, the mechanism has not been established, those who did and did not feel responsible were separated by their own answers, and carrying this over to life events is the article authors' analogy, which the experiment did not test.
In the study by Pociunaite and Zimprich (2023), 356 German-speaking adults aged 18 to 92, prompted by twelve cue words, recalled events more than a year old and rated each one; in all, 3,979 memories were collected. Emotional memories, positive and negative alike, turned out to be central; on average positive ones were rated as more central (2.89 versus 2.73 on a five-point scale); centrality was most strongly linked to the intensity of the experience and to how often a person thought about the event in private; a tendency to reflect was associated with higher centrality, while a tendency to ruminate was not. In the study by Wang and Singer (2020; 60 American and 60 Chinese students), self-defining memories were rated as very important in both groups, and Chinese students more often described memories of guilt and shame (18.3% versus 10%). The data are correlational and say nothing about causes, the Wang and Singer sample is small and its authors call the findings preliminary, and these studies do not show whether it is good or bad when a difficult event becomes central.
The open studies the authors read do not settle this: the experiments by Carlson and colleagues describe the first move only in small anonymous decisions about money, the studies of central memories do not follow people over time, and the meta-analysis of writing measures the effect of writing but not which move it supports. The article therefore does not claim that any move is better. In place of data it offers an argument: fitting preserves the story cheaply but can deprive a person of knowledge about themselves; rebuilding is honest towards the event but requires giving up part of the former story; leaving the event unfinished gives it a place without a ready-made meaning but requires bearing uncertainty — so it is more useful to understand which move is being made and whether it is being made by choice. This is a working hypothesis of the authors, not a conclusion drawn from data: the article's basis contains no open longitudinal study of this.
To acknowledge the event as one's own, without fitting it in or rebuilding the whole story around it, and to leave the question of its meaning open: the event remains a fact (“I did that”), but no final meaning is attached to it, neither “it doesn't count” nor “this is who I really am”. The article sets beside this the story of Moses in the Qur'an (Sura 28:15–16): he kills a man, at once prays “O my Lord, I have sinned to mine own hurt”, and God forgives him, while the story goes on; and verse 173 of the Dhammapada, where evil deeds are “covered by good deeds”. In the authors' reading, both traditions hold on to a double movement: the deed is acknowledged as one's own, and the person is not reduced to it. The “unfinished event” is the authors' secular reading, not the teaching of these traditions: in the Qur'an forgiveness is given by God, in the Dhammapada the subject is deeds and their fruits, and the article's basis contains no data showing that this move is more helpful than the others.
In the meta-analysis by Lee, Kim and Lim (Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2023) of 29 Korean studies of expressive writing with a control group, writing about difficult experience had, on average, an effect the authors call medium (g = 0.33) and, after correction for publication bias, not large (0.16). The effect was larger in studies with structured writing and with sessions longer than 15 minutes, but these are comparisons between studies, not experiments that varied the form of writing itself. That writing may help with the first step of any move, setting down what happened before memory yields, is the article authors' argument. All the studies were conducted in one country, most relied on self-reports, and the meta-analysis did not test which of the three moves writing supports.
If the event is connected with a severe experience, with harm done to someone, or with feelings you cannot bear on your own, it is worth turning to a psychologist or a doctor; if thoughts of harming yourself appear, seek help at once, and in immediate danger contact the emergency services of your country. This is the article authors' general caveat: it names no specific help services, and no clinical source on when a specialist is needed is among the article's sources.
Limits of interpretation
- Source references cover only the cited passages: traditional texts in the named English translations on Project Gutenberg (biblical passages in the King James Version); studies in the sections of the full texts that are named in the article's list of primary sources.
- The hypothetical example at the start was invented by the authors; the practical points are the authors' working criteria, not a method, not research findings and not a guarantee of results.
- Research: five experiments on small anonymous decisions about money (Carlson and colleagues, 2020); a correlational online study with a single rating of memories (Pociunaite and Zimprich, 2023); a small comparative sample of 60 + 60 students with preliminary findings (Wang and Singer, 2020); a meta-analysis of 29 studies from one country, Korea, mostly relying on self-reports (Lee, Kim and Lim, 2023). Correlations are not presented as causes.
- Carrying the results of the money experiment over to life events is the article authors' analogy; the experiment did not test it.
- The open studies read did not test which of the three moves is better over time; the article's basis contains no longitudinal data. The second and third moves, the comparison of the moves' costs and the role of those close to us are the authors' arguments, a working hypothesis, not a conclusion drawn from data.
- Religious and philosophical passages are attributed to their own texts and contexts (faith and repentance in Matthew, the bearing of the superior man in the Analects, prophetic rebuke in 2 Samuel, forgiveness given by God in the Qur'an, deeds and their fruits in the Dhammapada); a similarity of motifs does not mean a shared teaching or a historical link; the “unfinished event” is the authors' secular reading.
- The readings of Augustine, Montaigne and the scenes with Peter and Nathan are the authors' own and are marked in the article as “in our reading”; Augustine speaks of memory and self-knowledge, not of a story about oneself.
- The material makes no diagnoses and does not replace help from a psychologist or a doctor; a general caveat about seeing a specialist is given, no specific help services are named, and no clinical source on this is among the article's sources.
- Publication, library delivery and indexing were not performed in this task.
Sources
- Beyond Good and Evil — Friedrich Nietzsche
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E01): Beyond Good and Evil, ch. IV «Apophthegms and Interludes», § 68 (Zimmern). The work was not read in full.
- The King James Version of the Bible: Matthew 26; 2 Samuel 12 — The Bible
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E02, I-01-N03-E03, I-01-N03-E04, I-01-N03-E05, I-01-N03-E06, I-01-N03-E07): Matthew 26:33 (KJV); Matthew 26:33 (Russian Synodal translation); Matthew 26:75 (KJV); Matthew 26:75 (Russian Synodal translation); 2 Samuel 12:7 (KJV); 2 Samuel 12:7 (Russian Synodal translation, 2 Kings 12:7 in its numbering; beginning of the verse). The work was not read in full.
- The Confessions of St. Augustine — Augustine of Hippo
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E08): Confessions, Book X (X.8.15 in the usual division; Pusey). The work was not read in full.
- The Chinese Classics, vol. 1: Confucian Analects — Confucius (records of his disciples)
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E09): Analects, Book XIX, ch. XXI (Legge; words of Tsze-kung). The work was not read in full.
- Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete — Michel de Montaigne
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E10, I-01-N03-E11): Essays, Book III, ch. II «Of Repentance» (Cotton tr., Hazlitt ed.); ibid., near the end of the chapter. The work was not read in full.
- The Koran (Al-Qur'an) — The Qur'an
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E12, I-01-N03-E13): Sura 28 «The Story», v. 15 in the usual numbering (Rodwell); Sura 28, v. 16 in the usual numbering (Rodwell). The work was not read in full.
- The Dhammapada (Sacred Books of the East, vol. X) — Dhammapada
Read: the paragraphs around the excerpts (I-01-N03-E14): Dhammapada, ch. XIII «The World», v. 173 (Max Müller). The work was not read in full.
- Motivated misremembering of selfish decisions — Ryan W. Carlson, Michel André Maréchal, Bastiaan Oud, Ernst Fehr, Molly J. Crockett
Full text in the saved copy: RESULTS — Results (all subsections) (lines 33–76); DISCUSSION — Discussion (incl. alternative accounts) (lines 77–85); METHODS — Methods: participants, procedures, memory and control measures (lines 86–132). The abstract was not used for claims; excerpts are in READINGS/results/results_I-01-N03-S08.txt
- Characteristics of positive and negative autobiographical memories central to identity: emotionality, vividness, rehearsal, rumination, and reflection — Justina Pociunaite, Daniel Zimprich
Full text in the saved copy: METHODS — 2. Methods (lines 50–70); RESULTS — 3. Results (incl. tables) (lines 71–159); DISCUSSION — 4. Discussion (4.1–4.2) (lines 160–173); LIMITATIONS — 4.3. Limitations and future directions (lines 174–176); DISCUSSION — 5. Conclusion (lines 177–178). The abstract was not used for claims; excerpts are in READINGS/results/results_I-01-N03-S09.txt
- A Cross-Cultural Study of Self-Defining Memories in Chinese and American College Students — Yi Wang, Jefferson A. Singer
Full text in the saved copy: METHODS — Materials and Methods (lines 30–46); RESULTS — Results (incl. tables) (lines 47–87); DISCUSSION — Discussion, paras 1–7 (lines 88–95); LIMITATIONS — Discussion, limitations paragraph (lines 96–96); DISCUSSION — Conclusion (lines 97–98). The abstract was not used for claims; excerpts are in READINGS/results/results_I-01-N03-S10.txt
- Do expressive writing interventions have positive effects on Koreans?: a meta-analysis — Yeseul Lee, Dongil Kim, Jung-Eun Lim
Full text in the saved copy: METHODS — 2 Method (search, selection, coding, effect size synthesis) (lines 43–74); RESULTS — 3 Results (study characteristics, global effect size, moderators) (lines 75–149); DISCUSSION — 4 Discussion, paras 1–12 (lines 150–162); LIMITATIONS — 4 Discussion, limitations paragraphs (lines 163–165). The abstract was not used for claims; excerpts are in READINGS/results/results_I-01-N03-S11.txt