Ijtihad for Dummies: Why Your Cherished Opinion Doesn't Replace an Education

“Ask those who possess knowledge of the Scriptures.”

Quran, 16:43, passage; English back-render of the author's Russian translation based on Dr. Mustafa Khattab, The Clear Quran. Reminder for quote-mining enthusiasts: in its original context, this verse addresses a debate concerning the human nature of the messengers. No amount of wishful thinking can squeeze a comprehensive legal checklist of a mujtahid's qualifications out of it.

What This Article Is About

On the table sit an ancient rule and a freshly brewed everyday drama. Armchair experts split instantly into two camps: one demands with a straight face to mindlessly memorize an answer from a thousand years ago; the other screams with the delight of trailblazing discoverers that “the world has changed, wipe the slate clean!” Yet the grown-up work begins right in the middle — with the tedious, painstaking effort of figuring out what actually happened and why it holds legal relevance at all.

In the Islamic tradition, this process is known as ijtihad. And no, it is not “I’m an artist, that’s just how I feel.” It is a rigorously qualified derivation of a legal-religious ruling within a tradition, operating under strict rules, formal methodology (usul al-fiqh), analogy, and an acute awareness of the limits of one's own competence.

No fatwas or personal indulgences are handed out here. The task is far more modest: to show the average mind how a foundational source differs from its interpretation, why someone else's authority doesn't turn them into an infallible deity, and why your right to ask incisive questions of a specialist doesn't automatically turn you into a fountainhead of supreme wisdom.

I. Why the Mere Word “Effort” Is Not Enough

Every one of us exerts monumental mental effort when trying to locate a missing second sock or plow through a residential lease. But if you were to brand these spiritual agonies as ijtihad, jurists and legal scholars would, at the very least, smile mournfully. In the official text of Egypt’s Dar al-Ifta, “The craft of Issuing Fatwas,” section on qualifications, this term denotes the labor of a trained scholar working with canonical sources under the strictest requirements of competence.

While some revere and kiss the ancient dust and others demand burning it all down in the name of progress, a proper researcher asks a dry question: “What exactly has changed in the substance of the facts?” Sincere curiosity is wonderful, but if an amateur stares blissfully at a nuclear reactor blueprint for three hours, their enthusiasm deserves applause, yet letting them near the breaker switch is strictly out of the question. Sheer enthusiasm never compensates for gaps in structural mechanics.

In religion, the stakes are even higher: we are dealing with divine ordinance, not just optimizing routine convenience. Treating ijtihad as “freeform creative expression to one's taste” is a dangerous mistake. Any creative intellectual step must be rigorously justified within a recognized school, its methodology, and its language.

Does this mean the questioner must bow down and maintain reverent silence? Not at all. Asking “which sources did you use?”, “why was this specific case assigned to this category?”, and “did you definitely account for the details?” is the legitimate right of any human being. Acknowledging an expert's competence does not require believing in their infallibility, and respecting the inquirer does not mean their kitchen-table hunches equal years of rigorous scholarship.

II. Source, Understanding, and Ruling Are Distinct Levels

In Dar al-Ifta’s official document “Shariah Law,” sections on fiqh and its sources, it is explicitly stated that fiqh is purely human labor dedicated to deriving and applying norms. Ijtihad is anchored to sources and has nothing to do with a carnival of personal caprice. Furthermore, this represents a specific Sunni institutional position, not a neutral manifesto speaking for the entirety of the Islamic world.

This entire legal workshop is built across three distinct levels:

What is the baseline foundation (source)?
How exactly do we understand it (interpretation)?
How is the understood rule mapped onto a concrete reality (application)?

One can break one's neck on any of these steps: you can cite a fabricated or dubious text, you can misinterpret an utterly authentic report, or you can understand the law with crystalline perfection while completely misjudging what the defendant actually did.

A mundane analogy (claiming zero status as religious law): you promised to deliver a box to a friend by 3:00 PM. The text of the promise, the interpretation of its terms, and the delivery report are three completely different things. You delivered at 3:00 PM, but to a different city? One must investigate whether the location was part of the agreement: self-assurance alone is not enough. Between a line of text and a verdict lies an abyss of verification.

Therefore, the stubborn conservative slogan “everything is already written down!” can mask an unresolved question regarding what the text actually addressed. Meanwhile, the trendy relativist excuse “oh, everyone interprets things in their own way” masks the fact that some judgments rest on facts and logic, while others rely on empty fantasy. The fact that humans are fallible does not mean that every piece of nonsense is suddenly equivalent to a rigorously proven conclusion.

III. Qualification Protects Both the Subject and the Inquirer

According to that same guide, “Shariah Law” from Dar al-Ifta, a jurist is expected to possess a fluent command of the Quran, the Sunnah, the intricacies of the Arabic language, legal theory, the history of scholarly disputes across theological-legal schools, and a sober understanding of contemporary reality. This is not a manual on “how to become a mufti in 15 minutes via online clips,” but a stark demonstration of the sheer volume of learning blithely ignored by those chanting “come on, you just need to open the book and read!”

A text is not read word-by-word in isolation. Stripped of context, genre, and audience, a person will simply pluck convenient quotes to validate their favorite prejudices.

Furthermore, the hallmark of genuine qualification is an acute awareness of the limits of one’s own knowledge. A novice is confident as a tank precisely because they fail to see any complexity. A trained researcher may take longer to answer because they notice additional circumstances. The speed of delivering an answer does not in itself demonstrate its quality.

However, one should not swoon before another's titles. Respect for status does not turn a mortal human being into an absolute oracle. One must always verify: did the expert understand the underlying facts correctly, was their quotation misrepresented, and does their judgment genuinely fit the case at hand?

And above all: qualification protects the person seeking counsel. An irresponsible chatterbox will confidently utter an absurdity and stroll off to drink tea, leaving the gullible listener to deal with the wreckage of a shattered life.

IV. A New Situation Begins with an Accurate Description

The phrase “times have changed!” is completely worthless on its own. What exactly changed? The mechanics of the process? The legal consequences? Or was an old setup simply rebranded with a trendy buzzword?

Take a digital everyday scene (caution: this is neither a theological analogy nor a religious determination of status!): forwarding an electronic file. One person considers it identical to handing over a physical sheet of paper. Another counters that copying mechanics and access rights can fundamentally differ from handing over a paper copy. Before swinging a broadsword, one must gather the facts: who obtained access, is further copying possible, and what did the parties actually agree upon? The mere word “document” clarifies nothing here.

In Dar al-Ifta’s text “The craft of Issuing Fatwas,” opening sections, a thorough knowledge of circumstances is identified as a fundamental duty of the mufti. A technician explains how bytes travel across the wire. The jurist must grasp this reality, but the IT specialist does not issue the legal ruling.

Now comes the most painful part for human nature: separating facts from wishful thinking. Phrases like “well, he definitely meant this” or “everyone at the office does it that way” are not facts; they are your assumptions. Feed them into the foundation of your question, and you will receive an impeccable answer to a nonexistent problem.

Do not attempt telepathic mind-reading of other people's motives. Your personal sincerity does not guarantee an exhaustive picture: you may remember the deadline perfectly while forgetting the condition that triggered it in the first place. Concealing inconvenient details just to win an immediate argument can lead to advice about an incomplete or distorted case.

V. Analogy Demands a Substantive Ground of Resemblance

In the methodology of Sunni fiqh, there is a tool called qiyas (analogy). But this is not a child’s game of “spot the two matching pictures”; it is an intricate logical procedure requiring the identification of an underlying, substantive effective cause (‘illah).

Two cardboard boxes look identical, weigh five kilograms each, and are taped shut with blue duct tape. Can you gift them away? Superficially, the resemblance is absolute. But one box was bought by you, while the neighbor asked you to hold the second in your hallway. For the law, the color of the tape and the dimensions of the box are trivial; the ownership status is fundamental.

Analogy functions only when we can clearly answer:

What feature was critically vital to the original ruling?
Is that feature present in the new case?
Has a difference emerged that completely shatters the transfer of the ruling?

If a hypothetical office spat resembles a parking lot brawl only in emotional intensity, applying identical rules to both is pure intellectual laziness. Forcing a square peg into a round hole might calm your nerves, but it distorts reality. If an analogy simply helped highlight an overlooked obligation without yielding a finished verdict — fantastic! Acknowledge its utility and keep investigating, rather than declaring two situations completely identical just because it comforts you.

VI. Disagreement Among Schools Does Not Mean Picking Whatever Is Convenient

When people discover that legal traditions contain distinct schools of thought (madhhabs), two extremes emerge. Perfectionists throw tantrums: “Why isn’t there a single unified manual?!” Opportunists rub their hands in glee: “Splendid, that means I can grab whatever benefits me right now from whichever school!” Both approaches are equally illiterate.

In the third point of the Amman Message, the recognition of traditional schools is tightly bound to methodology and qualification. This is an important contemporary normative document concerning mutual recognition, but it does not mean that all scholars throughout human history agreed on everything, nor does it erase doctrinal divergences.

Consider the Shia tradition: Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's guide, chapter on following a jurist. It presents a strictly Twelver Usuli framework (ijtihad, following the most learned — taqlid, precaution). It cannot be mechanically projected onto all Shia communities worldwide, much less equated with Sunni qiyas.

Scholarly disagreement is not a bazaar clearance sale where one can quietly conceal inconvenient facts while hopping from one authority to another in search of the most lenient answer. If two authorities diverge, one must examine their underlying premises and methods; sometimes, an authentic substantive disagreement remains even after that examination. The phrase “this answer resonates with me” merely announces your appetite; it proves nothing about the legal validity of your choice.

VII. Were the “Gates” Ever Closed Once and for All?

A convenient myth circulates among popular history buffs: once upon a time, Muslims engaged in active reflection until, on one gloomy Tuesday, shadowy villains showed up and “closed the gate of ijtihad,” plunging everyone into intellectual hibernation until a later “reopening of the gates.”

In Wael B. Hallaq’s academic paper “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” (1984), the widespread historical assumption is called into question. Honest caveat: within the scope of our review, only the abstract and bibliographic record were examined, not the complete text. Consequently, we have no scholarly right to attribute sweeping sensational conclusions or precise historical dates to Hallaq (unlike those fond of judging books by their covers).

Modern statutes and fatwas routinely employ the term “ijtihad” and attach stringent prerequisites to it. The sheer presence of these terms today demonstrates that the concept remains alive within specific institutions; it by no means proves that these institutions operated continuously and identically across every school and century.

One must strictly distinguish between:

the rhetorical plea of a medieval author (“stop inventing things, stick to the classical manuals!”),
the formal doctrine of a school,
the actual legal practice in courtrooms.

Just because someone yelled “The gate is closed!” does not mean everyone obediently laid down their pens and walked into the sunset. Do not mistake a single alleged date of closing or reopening for an established historical verdict without appropriate evidence — the history of jurisprudence is far more complex than sensational headlines.

VIII. Translation and Confident Retelling Do Not Replace Competence

If a text sounds smooth and elegant in another language, it demonstrates nothing more than syntactic coherence and readability. Readability alone does not establish source fidelity or specialist competence.

In a dedicated advisory by Dar al-Ifta on deriving legal rulings from translations of the Quran, it is stated in black and white: legal derivation demands foundational knowledge of the Arabic language and legal methodology. Our article merely conveys this institution’s position without issuing theological verdicts on the personal faith of its readers.

A translation is always someone else's interpretation. One rendering writes “must,” while another suggests “recommended.” If a reader simply selects the phrasing that flatters their preferences, they are engaging in plain self-deception. Artificial intelligence can produce coherent phrasing, but coherence does not equal source fidelity or contextual accuracy.

Reading translations for general perspective is useful. Using them to craft intelligent questions for scholars is wonderful. But constructing a complex legal claim out of a vernacular translation and running off to lecture others is the height of presumption.

IX. General Rule, Interpretive Method, and the Boundary of Authority

Usul al-fiqh reminds us that deriving a ruling is a systemic link connecting sacred text, recognized methodology of a school, and the concrete circumstances of life. In materials from Dar al-Ifta, a sharp distinction is drawn between an individual’s personal prestige and the objective authority of their argumentation.

Attempts to draw cross-cultural parallels require surgical precision:

Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (V.10) brilliantly showed that general law cannot anticipate every specific eventuality, and that equitable rectification reflects what the lawgiver would have said had they known the particular circumstances. But caution: Aristotle speaks of laws enacted by mortal men! In ijtihad, no one is permitted to “correct” divine revelation based on their own vague personal intuition.
The Catholic document Dei Verbum (§§9–10) stresses that the Church’s Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but humbly serves it. Yet the Catholic Magisterium and an Islamic mufti are fundamentally distinct institutions in terms of structure, theology, and scope of authority.
Even within Islam, Shia guidance from al-Sistani functions within its own tradition: it cannot be thoughtlessly mapped onto a Sunni madhhab or treated as exhaustive of the views of all Shia traditions worldwide.

An inquirer’s question “on what basis did you reach this conclusion?” is entirely legitimate. However, the right to ask questions does not elevate the questioner to the bench of a judge empowered to arbitrarily vacate that verdict.

X. Fidelity Demands the Labor of Understanding

Ijtihad is neither a rebellion against tradition nor the blind recitation of ancient formulas. It is strenuous intellectual labor performed for the sake of fidelity to core foundations. Mindlessly parroting a quote without regard for surrounding realities can corrupt the very essence of the law. Conversely, claiming “new context” as an excuse for unbridled license is ordinary intellectual fraud.

Discard any single link — the source, the method, the facts, or the competence — and the entire construct collapses into the trash bin. An impeccable citation will not rescue you if you fabricated the facts. A detailed description of an event does not replace knowledge of the legal ratio of the norm.

And remember: life moves forward. Let us return to our digital, non-religious scene. You consulted a specialist about securely transmitting a confidential file to a single colleague. An answer was provided. A week later, folder access is opened to the entire company. Does this mean the expert’s previous advice was flawed? Not automatically: the earlier explanation applied strictly to the conditions presented at that time. Applying it to the new situation without fresh analysis is sheer superficiality.

A specialist's answer must be assessed within the boundaries of the stated premises; that does not by itself establish that the answer was correct. A change in circumstances does not invalidate the past, but it demands an honest new inquiry rather than hiding behind an obsolete memo.

What This Means in Practice

We issue no fatwas or legal advice here. The following is an entirely voluntary, everyday, and strictly non-religious exercise designed to sharpen critical thinking in the workplace, at home, or when managing shared resources:

Record a single rule and its source. Write down a specific work agreement or promise. Avoid vagueness: clarify who agreed to what, and where it was documented.
Describe the facts without venom or evaluations. Cross out lines like “that slacker ruined everything.” State dryly: “Agreed deadline was 12:00 PM. At 12:00 PM the file was not delivered due to a building power outage.”
Separate facts from your hypotheses. What is verifiable via screenshots and system logs, and what stems from your personal suspicion? State the blind spots directly without inventing sinister hidden motives for others.
Evaluate substantive changes. What exactly shifted in the working conditions? Does an internet disruption impact the obligation to submit a report on time, or was an internet connection unnecessary for that task?
Stress-test the analogy for breaking points. If you find yourself saying, “This is just like what happened with Smith’s report last time!”, immediately locate at least one critical distinction between Smith’s situation and the current one.
Formulate a precise question for a specialist. Recognize where your own competence ends. Do not play the role of an in-house attorney or system administrator. Compile a concise summary of the facts (without concealing inconvenient details) and pose a clear question to the professional.
Draw a qualified partial conclusion. Note what has been verified, what remains uncertain, what action is permissible in this everyday non-religious situation, and where a separate determination is required.

Remember: acknowledging the boundaries of one's intellect is not weakness, but the highest form of honesty. No diagnoses of individuals or guarantees for the future are offered here: there is only the discipline of clear thought.

Key Quote

“Do not pursue that of which you have no certain knowledge.”

Quran, 17:36, passage; English back-render of the author's Russian translation based on Dr. Mustafa Khattab, The Clear Quran. Important note: this represents a foundational moral prohibition against the reckless pursuit of guesswork, not an exhaustive methodological treatise on jurisprudence.

Connections Across Traditions

This table presents solely the analytical comparisons of the authors. We do not invent historical influence where rigorous documentary evidence is lacking.

Subject	Positions and Reference Points	Basis for Comparison	Where the Boundary Lies
General and Particular	Dar Al-Ifta: Case Description — Aristotle, Ethics V.10	Applying an abstract rule to concrete reality requires precise knowledge of the factual context.	Aristotle addresses human legislation; in ijtihad, divine revelation cannot be altered based on personal intuition.
Source and Authority	Usul al-Fiqh: Dar Al-Ifta Account — Dei Verbum 9–10	The authority of an interpretation must demonstrate a traceable link to an acknowledged source.	The Catholic teaching office (Magisterium) and the office of an Islamic legal scholar (mufti) are not equivalent in institution or theology.
Distinct Legal Frameworks	Dar Al-Ifta: Qualification — Al-Sistani: Opening of Islamic Laws	Legal derivation demands qualified scholarship and canonical grounding rather than the inquirer's preference.	Sunni doctrine is not identical to the Twelver Usuli model, and the latter does not represent all Shia traditions worldwide.
Questioning and Foundation of Norms	Dar Al-Ifta: Fiqh and Sources — Plato, Euthyphro 10a–11b	The foundational basis of a judgment must be strictly distinguished from external approval.	Plato’s dialogue on pagan deities provides no ready-made Islamic legal rulings and does not turn the reader into a mufti.
Knowledge and Verification	Quran 17:36 — AN 3.65	Habitual self-assurance must be evaluated through critical examination of underlying premises.	The Buddhist sutta evaluates harm, benefit, and the censure of the wise by its own standards; the Quranic verse prohibits following ignorance; neither replaces the usul al-fiqh method.
History and Normative Demands	Hallaq: Closure Question, Abstract — Amman Message, Point 3	Historical investigation of past practice and contemporary normative calls for order belong to different genres.	The abstract of a paper does not prove a definitive historical verdict, and a modern document does not guarantee historical uniformity across prior centuries.

Primary Sources

Please note: primary sacred texts, normative institutional declarations, and academic research articles are strictly demarcated. An academic reference does not turn into sacred scripture simply because it appears in this list.

Egypt’s Dar Al-Ifta. The craft of Issuing Fatwas. Examined: definition of ijtihad, demarcation of roles, competence requirements, verification of circumstances, and ethics of responsibility. The historical premise of a total cessation of the practice is not accepted as an established fact. Official text.
Egypt’s Dar Al-Ifta. Shariah Law. Sections on fiqh, roots of law, jurist training, and the relationship between norms and facts. This institutional Sunni position is not extrapolated to all Islamic traditions. Official account.
The Three Points of the Amman Message, V.1. Point 3: qualification and rigorous methodology for issuing fatwas. A modern normative intra-Muslim document, not an empirical chronicle of historical consensus. Document text.
Ali al-Sistani. Islamic Laws, Chapter One: Following a Jurist (Taqlīd). Opening provisions and note 1: a specific Twelver Usuli model of following a jurist and ijtihad (neither Sunni qiyas nor the position of all Shia groups). Official manual.
Wael B. Hallaq. Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed? International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16(1), 1984, 3–41. DOI: 10.1017/S0020743800027598. Caution: only the abstract and bibliographic record were consulted; the full text was not examined. No sweeping attributed conclusions regarding exact dates of closure or reopening are made. Bibliographic entry and abstract.
Egypt’s Dar Al-Ifta, Fatwa Council. Deriving legal rulings from the translations of the Quran. July 12, 2017. The institution’s position on the strict necessity of linguistic and legal training; presented without passing theological judgment on the readers. Official ruling.
Quran, 16:43. Primary religious text; English translation by Dr. Mustafa Khattab, The Clear Quran. Passage on consulting those who possess knowledge of the Scriptures within the context of the debate on human messengers. Text and cited passage.
Quran, 17:36. Primary religious text; English translation by Dr. Mustafa Khattab, The Clear Quran. Moral prohibition against following that of which one has no certain knowledge. Text and cited passage.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, V.10, 1137b; English translation by W. D. Ross. Primary philosophical text: epieikeia (equitable correction of overly broad human law). Text and cited passage.
Second Vatican Council. Dei Verbum, §§9–10. Primary Catholic normative document: relationship between Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium. Text and cited passage.
Plato. Euthyphro, 10a–11b; English edition via Project Gutenberg. Primary philosophical dialogue: the dilemma of piety and divine approval. Text and cited passage.
AN 3.65, Kālāma / Kesamutti Sutta; translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Primary Buddhist canonical text: evaluation of qualities and deeds based on harm, benefit, and the judgment of the wise. Text and cited passage.

About the Authors

Andrey Zarinsh is the author and founder of the United Wisdom project. He explores themes of inner transformation, the unity of traditions, intercultural dialogue, and contemporary spiritual discipline. Instagram: @andrey.zarinsh.

Maria Evilkut is the co-author of United Wisdom. Alongside her research work, she strives to test these ideas in practice and observe how principles of unity and mutual understanding operate in real life between people and across cultures. Instagram: @ilkutki.