An intelligible description does not confirm existence. Physical admissibility needs conditions; probability needs a model and information. Action additionally depends on resources and consent. Name the achieved result and the next open question.
Questions explored
Does conceivability establish that an event exists?
No. A factual assertion needs separate evidence; description and existence are distinguished here.
Do two named outcomes have equal probabilities?
Not automatically. A model, information and grounds for equal possibility are needed; the number of words establishes none of these.
How can an option remain open without promising success?
Name the checked condition, separate assumption and unknown, then select a relevant next step. This proposed record has no established efficacy.
Key distinctions
Hume distinguishes relations of ideas from matters of fact in E 4.1–4.2. (Bounded historical context E 4.1–4.6; not a complete modern criterion of physical possibility.)
Descartes distinguishes a conceived triangle’s properties from its existence. (IV in Veitch’s translation; a passage within his certainty argument without adopting the entire metaphysics.)
Laplace’s probability argument depends on information and conditions of cases. (II and opening III, Truscott/Emory, 1902. Ideal knowledge is not attributed to an actual person.)
Einstein specifies a synchronisation procedure for spatially separated clocks. (§1 in the specified English edition, without reproducing the whole paper or treating personal impression as physical time.)
Hypothetical room, cabinet and card examples distinguish different checking results. (This article’s working arrangement. Another person’s consent is not a resource already possessed; the record’s efficacy is unstudied.)
Limits of interpretation
- A bounded distinction among meanings of possibility, not a complete modal-logic, physics or probability course. Historical positions remain distinct. Intelligibility, fact, model conditions and access to action do not replace each other; ignorance establishes no equal probabilities. Everyday scenes are hypothetical. Consent is not presumed; no record efficacy, clinical effect or guarantee of success is claimed.
Sources
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, E 4.1–4.6 — David Hume
Complete E4.1–4.6 web15–37; E4.7 opening39 only. Whole section not credited.
Source use: HISTORICAL_PRIMARY_EDITION_BOUNDED_USE_JURISDICTION_UNRESOLVED
- Discourse on the Method — René Descartes
Title/translator metadata; PartI opening web37–71; complete PartIV151–178 through overlapping actual returned body. No French original or Meditations claimed read.
Source use: HISTORICAL_PRIMARY_EDITION_BOUNDED_USE_JURISDICTION_UNRESOLVED
- A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities — Pierre-Simon Laplace
Complete chaptersI119–125 andII127–165; first three principles inIII168–179. French original/wholeEssay not credited.
Source use: HISTORICAL_PRIMARY_EDITION_BOUNDED_USE_JURISDICTION_UNRESOLVED
- On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies — Albert Einstein
Full introduction and §1 web0–38; opening §2 web39–54; About this Edition439–443. Whole §2, §3 derivation, German original and whole paper not credited to root.
Source use: HISTORICAL_PRIMARY_EDITION_BOUNDED_USE_JURISDICTION_UNRESOLVED