Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspension of Judgment — In Plain Words

Epigraph

“Those who are still seeking are the Sceptics.”

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.3 (English rendering of the Russian quotation in the original article, based on Mary Mills Patrick, 1899).

I. How a Prepackaged Answer Becomes the Price of Admission

Picture a typical collective ritual: two haphazardly cropped screenshots of a chat drop into the channel. Context: zero. Backstory: nonexistent. Yet armchair experts are already banging their gavels: “Everything is obvious!”, “Don’t you dare defend the abuser!”, “I knew who the villain was right away!”. You aren’t just expected to have an opinion—you are required to immediately purchase the wholesale package of righteous fury: name the guilty party on the spot, brand their motives, choose the correct side of the barricades, and swear allegiance to the collective verdict.

Dare to remark that the data seems a little thin, and you are instantly branded an accomplice or a coward. Vendors of absolute morality adore neatly packaged narratives: the roles are assigned, the villain is cast, and the torches are lit. Yet withholding a hasty sentence is not flight. One can straightforwardly acknowledge that the published words sound vile, demand an end to harassment, and still honestly state: we do not know the full story and motives. But do not confuse skepticism with puffed-up snobbery: claiming the moral high ground, rolling your eyes in disdain, and declaring everyone else a fool is not an inquiry—it is merely the cheap posture of a self-important bystander.

II. Pyrrho and the Portrait of the Man Who Decides Nothing

The brand name traces back to Pyrrho of Elis (4th–3rd centuries BCE). Yet Pyrrho himself left behind not a single line (Katja Vogt, “Ancient Skepticism”, §4.1). Whenever someone entertains you with anecdotes about his life, open Diogenes Laërtius, IX.62. There you will indeed find the yarn about the sage who supposedly couldn’t care less about precipices, feral dogs, or hurtling wagons, leaving his friends to literally drag him out from under carriage wheels.

It is a splendid caricature: a philosopher doubts the reality of a ditch and cheerfully tumbles right in. Yet right there in the same passage, Diogenes cites the testimony of Aenesidemus: Pyrrho was entirely sound and prudent in everyday affairs. Systematic, robust Pyrrhonism is known to us thanks to Sextus Empiricus, who lived much later (likely in the 2nd–3rd centuries CE) and whose exact dates remain unknown (Benjamin Morison, “Sextus Empiricus”, §§1–2). To attribute every one of Sextus’s logical constructs personally to the semi-legendary Pyrrho is to walk straight into the very trap of rushing to believe a tidy fairy tale.

III. Denial Can Become a Dogma Too

At the opening of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.1–4, Sextus divides thinkers into three categories: those who are convinced they have grasped the truth by the beard; those who solemnly swear that the world cannot be known at all; and those who persist in seeking. Sextus nowhere sets out to prove the impossibility of all knowledge—he simply keeps testing. Announcing with a knowing smirk, “There is no truth; the world is unknowable,” is the exact same ironclad dogma, merely turned inside out.

“Dogma” here is a strict technical term: assent to a non-evident philosophical proposition concerning the hidden nature of things (I.13). And the skeptic’s epoché (suspension of judgment) arises neither from laziness nor from a mere shortage of information, but when the opposing arguments under consideration appear equipollent—of seeming equal weight (I.8–10). The cynic who mutters, “All do-gooders are just hypocrites out for personal gain,” fancies himself a hard-nosed realist; in reality, he is trapped inside a dogma of distrust, bending every fact to fit a pre-cooked cynical verdict.

IV. Honey Doesn't Lose Its Sweetness Over a Philosophical Question

In I.19–20, Sextus considers the case of honey. The skeptic by no means asserts that honey is tasteless. He experiences its sweetness and yields to that sensation. What comes under question is solely the dogmatist’s metaphysical verdict: “Honey is sweet in itself, by its underlying, objective nature.” This marks skepticism’s crucial dividing line: maintain the boundary between the appearance (what is directly experienced) and the assertion about the nature of the thing.

Skepticism is not an ancient personal growth seminar. If someone’s words cause you pain, the pain is real, and there is no need to play an unfeeling log. But the pain itself does not demonstrate a covert, malicious intent on the speaker’s part. Keep three things apart: what I am feeling right now, what is actually being asserted about the situation, and which of those assertions are genuinely substantiated.

V. How Opposition Works

In I.31–32, Sextus demonstrates a classic intellectual clinch. The theologian proclaims: “Behold the flawless motion of the stars—the cosmos is governed by a benevolent Providence!”. The skeptic counters with a fact of earthly life: “Why, then, do scoundrels wallow in luxury while the righteous suffer?”. The skeptic puts this forward not out of blind faith in chaos, but to test the sturdiness of the other party’s grandiloquence.

The skeptical pause, epoché (suspension of judgment), is tied to isostheneia—the seeming equipollence of grounds: the arguments under consideration on both sides appear equally persuasive (I.8–10, 196). Two opinions do not become equal simply because someone voiced them. In a debate, one cannot place a verified record of events on equal footing with a drunken commenter shouting, “What if it’s a deepfake?”. Equipollence demands painstaking inquiry, and in I.34 Sextus candidly admits: if no answer is found today, perhaps a stronger counterargument will turn up tomorrow. Ongoing inquiry does not prove eternal insolubility.

VI. Five Ways to Interrogate a Foundation

Agrippa’s Modes (I.164–177; Katja Vogt, §4.3) are not a death sentence for all empirical science, but a snare for anyone fond of constructing absolute theories on sand:

Dispute (Dissent): Experts argue until they are blue in the face, some leaning on sensory perception, others on pure reason.
Infinite Regress: Every “because” demands another “because,” vanishing into a vicious infinity with no bedrock.
Vicious Circle: Sight is confirmed through the intellect, while the intellect is cross-checked by sight.
Arbitrary Hypothesis: Exhausted from arguing, the dogmatist slams his fist on the table: “We shall take this axiom as true just because!”—forgetting that his opponent can pull the exact opposite premise out of thin air with equal justification.
Relativity: Everything is perceived through the lens of a specific observer, lighting, and context.

In daily life, we are forced to adopt working assumptions to launch a rocket or simmer soup, but an honest mind understands: a working hypothesis is an operational tool, not an eternal truth of the cosmos.

VII. Can Open-Endedness Yield Tranquility?

Sextus connects suspension of judgment with ataraxia—tranquility of mind (I.25–30). In Sextus’s account, skeptics initially hoped to attain peace by settling the truth about things; yet, confronted with the seeming equipollence of arguments, they suspended judgment—and tranquility followed unexpectedly. Ongoing inquiry does not prove that every metaphysical dispute is eternally insoluble. Sextus recounts the anecdote of the painter Apelles: struggling to depict the foam at a horse’s mouth, he flung the sponge he used to wipe his brushes at the canvas in sheer frustration, and the accidental impact rendered the foam perfectly.

A lovely parable, but it remains an ancient metaphor, not clinically validated therapy, and certainly not a guarantee of nirvana. Tranquility is not guaranteed; pain, cold, hunger, and disease do not evaporate into thin air (I.29–30). According to Sextus, one can refrain from tacking onto these unavoidable experiences the dogmatic judgment that what is happening is an evil by its very nature. That is his philosophical explanation, not a promise to insulate any human being from suffering.

VIII. Living Without a Final Theory of Life

If nothing is settled, are we to lie down and die? Sextus answers: the skeptic goes about normal, everyday life without fuss (I.21–24). He yields to hunger (and eats), abides by the laws of the polis, follows traditions, and exercises professional crafts. Scholars, however, continue to clash over precisely which beliefs Sextus actually retains (Benjamin Morison, §3.4).

It is essential to recognize the dividing lines:

Descartes (Meditations on First Philosophy, I–II) employs radical doubt as a bulldozer to clear the lot for an unshakeable, granite foundation (Cogito). Sextus, by contrast, had no intention of building absolute foundations whatsoever.
Epictetus (Enchiridion, §§1, 5) separates what is up to us from what is not, but rests firmly on a Stoic framework of a providential cosmos and duty—a framework a Pyrrhonist would instantly call into question.
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka (Jan Westerhoff, “Nāgārjuna”, §§1–2; Richard Hayes, “Madhyamaka”, §§1, 4–5) dismantles the notion of intrinsic existence (svabhāva), but Buddhist emptiness (śūnyatā) unfolds within the doctrine of liberation from saṃsāra and the framework of the two truths. A superficial resemblance in technique to Sextus does not indicate identity of concepts, and no historical influence has been established in this comparison.

Everyday life for Sextus and our contemporary practice are fundamentally different things. Custom and law are not sacred: if an accepted tradition maims people, appealing to custom does not shield it from critique. Modern practice is not a definition of ancient dogma.

IX. What This Means in Practice

Return to the internet outrage. You lack the full picture—so call the unknown by its proper name. But bear in mind: the skeptical pause is not an indulgence for cowardly inaction in the face of apparent harm.

Not knowing a delinquent’s hidden psychological motives does not mean failing to notice the brick flying toward the storefront. Apparent harm permits feasible, safe action—such as seeking help or holding boundaries—without waiting for a definitive treatise on the ultimate nature of the Good. Every hesitation carries a price, and the possible consequences of both action and inaction deserve consideration. Sober skepticism is the readiness to turn off the screen without handing down a verdict on someone else’s soul, leaving the matter open until new facts emerge.

A Voluntary Practice of Suspension

Try this exercise: when logging into social media, catch yourself red-handed at the very first impulse to pass a moral verdict on a twenty-second clip.

Disentangle what you saw: here is the physical action on the screen (the appearance), and there is your embroidered story about the person’s inner nature. This is a modern application, not a definition of ancient dogma.
Ask yourself the question prompted by the Mode of Relativity: from what broader context was this fragment torn?
Weigh the cost of waiting: if there is no apparent harm requiring feasible, safe action, you can decline to click and comment. You are under no obligation to provide the grand finale for someone else’s narrative.

Key Quotation

“I determine nothing.”

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.197 (English rendering of the Russian quotation in the original article, based on Mary Mills Patrick).

This phrase is neither a fresh dogma nor a creed. In I.206–208, Sextus clarifies that skeptical expressions purge themselves, just as a purgative evacuates itself along with the bodily fluids it drives out. It is merely a report of the inquirer’s personal state of mind at that very instant.

Seven Comparisons Across Traditions

One Side	The Other Side	Connection and Limit of Comparison
Pyrrhonian suspension (epoché) in Sextus	The assertion that knowledge is impossible	The present inability to choose an answer does not demonstrate the impossibility of an answer altogether; continuing inquiry does not prove eternal insolubility.
The appearance followed by the skeptic	A proposition regarding the nature of the thing	Acknowledging what is experienced is not equivalent to a definitive explanation of what objectively exists.
Pyrrhonian inquiry	Cartesian doubt	Descartes hunts for an indubitable bedrock; a similar opening move does not establish a shared objective.
Sextus’s focus on judgment	Epictetus’s Stoic reasoning	Judgment is pivotal in both frameworks, yet the grounds of assent and moral orientation diverge.
Testing foundations in Sextus	Critique of intrinsic existence (svabhāva) in Madhyamaka	One may compare their handling of truth claims; epoché and emptiness differ in substance and aims. No historical continuity has been established here.
Equipollence of opposed arguments (isostheneia)	Giving equal floor to any arbitrary version	Symmetry of presentation does not in itself demonstrate equal persuasiveness.
Modern action under incomplete knowledge	The full ancient skeptical program	The proposed application retains personal responsibility and reappraisal under apparent harm; modern practice is not a definition of ancient dogma.

Sources and Studies for This Article

Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I, §§1–4, 7–15, 19–35, 164–177, 196–208. English translation by Mary Mills Patrick in Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, Cambridge, 1899, Project Gutenberg, ebook 17556.
Diogenes Laërtius. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, IX.61–62. English translation by R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, 1925, LacusCurtius.
Katja Vogt. “Ancient Skepticism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised September 21, 2022, §§4.1 and 4.3.
Benjamin Morison. “Sextus Empiricus”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised March 12, 2026, §§1–2, 3.2, and 3.4.
René Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations I–II. Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane / Haldane–Ross, 1911, Boston University.
Epictetus. Enchiridion, §§1 and 5. English translation by Elizabeth Carter, Internet Classics Archive.
Jan Westerhoff. “Nāgārjuna”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised May 31, 2026, §§1–2.
Richard Hayes. “Madhyamaka”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised August 18, 2023, §§1, 4–5.

Finale

Refusing to deliver an instantaneous sentence is not a symptom of intellectual sloth. It is the capacity to restrain your own vanity from the temptation to cap someone else’s complex story with a phony period. In a world swarming with rabid preachers and infallible magistrates, the pause can help ensure you do not preemptively multiply folly.